Coup in Romania - Fact or Fiction?

Rules of the Game

First of all, I want to mention the rules by which I will guide this point of view. I want it to be as clear as possible how and why I think the way I do, and my hope is that from my subjective yet well-documented opinion, I will be able to help inform the public in an impartial and decent manner.

We are training in a period where misinformation affects both sides, who have forgotten that they are fighting for the same goal - a better Romania.

The reasoning belongs to all of us - regardless of preferences, as long as the information is not distorted, people can draw their own conclusions using their own judgment.

So, let's get started:

What are my conflicts of interest?

We start with what we voted for, what I want from Romania, what ideology I hold, because all of these are becoming increasingly important today.

Credit in the European ProjectI have undertaken several initiatives involving the European Commission, and I believe that the European Union is the salvation for Romania. Without mutually beneficial foreign influences to keep corruption in Romania in check, we cannot progress.

Cred Thanks to the European project, the Romanian diaspora has been able to find jobs, earn money to invest back in the country, without which Romania would be a much darker place - quite literally, considering a light bulb costs 1000 RON.

Cred Due to our obligations to the EU, we have transparency in public procurement, we have been sanctioned for judicial deviations, and we have modernized certain mechanisms in the country.

Cred at the same time The opening towards the West should not erase our traditions.The moral values, and that the loss of national identity will not do us any good. Implicitly, I do not want the importance of family to be lost - the core without which society cannot exist, literally.

I believe that selfishness is irrational.Since we depend on the people around us and their well-being. Humanity has not reached where it is today because a single person did something, but because billions of people have worked to build an ecosystem that allows us to have hospitals, schools, universities, and even to put a man on the moon. Collaboration is essential - with neighbors, with those from the same city as us, with citizens of other countries.

Credtherefore, A healthy policy is one that looks not only inward but also outward. (the one from the apartment building, the one from the city, the one from another country). Implicitly, this leads me to believe that there is a need for an efficient social structure that assists the most unfortunate among us, who, not out of their own laziness, but due to chance or lack of luck, are worse off than we are.

Cred people are differentThey have different values and interests, but at their core, they are similar. To protect their rights and allow them to enjoy their own interests and values, we need a mechanism that shields us from the intrusions of the most powerful - a strong, impartial, and fair justice system.

Trust in democracywith its good and bad aspects, because although it is easy to believe that some people are more intelligent, more educated, or more capable of making decisions, people have free will and the right to determine their own future. When representation is made by elites, it is possible that even well-intentioned elites may omit information, thus harming society. And the crowd, through its collective analytical capacity, can make a decision that is much more likely to be correct. No other decision-making method increases the success rate in society.

Trust in transparencyBecause I trust the analytical abilities of those around me, and I am confident that as long as I act in good faith, the good deeds I perform will outweigh the mistakes I will inevitably make.

Cred in dialogbecause no one holds the absolute truth. Only through fair debates can we reach a correct conclusion.

How will I draft the article?

You will use AI relatively intensively, either to summarize information, to correct my writing, or to guide me in drafting. Moreover, the use of artificial intelligence tools moderates discourse and adds a level of neutrality to the presentation of the situation.

Determinants of the crisis

I believe that the first step to understanding what is happening must start from the socio-political and historical context of the country, a context that has shaped the national culture and thus determined the decisions we have made as a people. I will emphasize political currents, social and economic crises, and their impact on society. We have focused on the Legionary Movement, as well as the present, being the most important periods for the current situation.

The history of Romania since World War I and how it tends to repeat itself

1. In 1918-1920, Greater Romania rises from the ashes World War Ibut it inherits deep structural problems. The peasants, who represented over 80% of the population, live in precarious conditions, and latent antisemitism and extremist nationalism are beginning to take root in the universities of Greater Romania, where A.C. Cuza develop doctrines that will later influence The Legionary Movement.
2. Period 1920-1924 introduce the first signs of radicalization. At the University of Iași, Professor A.C. Cuza and the student Corneliu Zelea Codreanu formsNational Christian Defense League" (LANC), an organization that combines antisemitism with radical nationalism, and antisemitic violence in Romanian universities is becoming increasingly frequent. In 1924Codreanu assassinates the police prefect of Iași, Constantin Manciu, being acquitted in a trial that demonstrates the influence of the far-right in the judiciary. This "legitimization" of violence through the legal system becomes a model for the future actions of the movement.
3. In 1927Corneliu Zelea Codreanu founded the "Legion of Archangel Michael" on the foundation of a personal history already marked by violence. In 1924, Codreanu assassinated the police prefect of Iași, Constantin Manciu, and was acquitted in a trial that demonstrated the influence of the far-right in the judiciary. This "legitimization" of violence through the legal system becomes a model for the future actions of the movement.
   
   At its founding on June 24, 1927, alongside the initial core formed by Ion Moța, Ilie Gârneață, Corneliu Georgescu, and Radu Mironovici, a dual structure of the organization is established. Publicly, the legionaries present themselves as a spiritual and social movement, engaging in voluntary work in villages, repairing churches and building dikes.
   
   However, in secret, "death squads" are being formed - special groups trained for political assassinations and intimidation. The "cells" system (units of 3-13 members) serves not only for ideological education and community work but also as a structure for violent actions.
4. Period 1929-1933 marks the transformation of the Legionary Movement into a mass organization that systematically combines social work with terror.
   
   While on the surface the legionnaires develop social support networks - student canteens, cooperative shops, workshops - underground, the campaign of violence intensifies. Assassinations are meticulously planned in "nests" and then presented as acts of "popular justice".
   
   The victims are strategically chosen: politicians, journalists, Jewish intellectuals, or opponents of the movement.
   
   Each assassination is followed by a media campaign in legionary publications that transforms the criminals into "martyrs of the national cause." A cult of "purifying" violence develops, ideologically justified as necessary for "national rebirth."
   
   At the universities in Iași, Bucharest, and Cluj, the legionnaires combine the offer of scholarships and dormitory places with the systematic intimidation of Jewish students and professors deemed "hostile".
   
   Legionary marches across the country often include violence against local Jewish communities. In 1930The name "Iron Guard" is chosen precisely to emphasize the militant character of the movement.
   
   The success of this dual strategy - violence and social assistance - is evident in the dramatic increase in membership, from a few hundred in 1927 to tens of thousands in 1933, when the assassination of Prime Minister I.G. Duca demonstrates the true power of the organization.
5. Between 1934-1937The Legionary Movement reaches the peak of its influence. Intellectuals such as Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran and Nae Ionescu provides cultural legitimacy. The organization develops a network of cooperative stores, workshops, and canteens for students, presenting itself as an alternative to the "corrupt" democratic system. Codreanu publishes "For the LegionnairesThe book that becomes the "bible" of the movement.
6. In December 1937The parliamentary elections produce an unprecedented result in Romania's history. For the first time, the ruling party (the National Liberal Party led by Gheorghe Tătărescu) fails to secure the necessary majority to form a government, receiving only 35.92% of the votes.
   
   The National Peasant Party obtains 20.4%, while the PartyEverything for the Country"(the legal name of the Legionary Movement) ranks third with 15.58% of the votes - the best result for the far-right during the interwar period."
   Voters thus penalize the clientelist system and endemic corruption, but the fragmentation of the vote creates a profound constitutional crisis.
7. At the beginning of 1938, Romania is in a deep political crisis. The failure of the December 1937 elections to produce a clear majority provided King Carol II with the perfect pretext to implement his authoritarian plans.
   
   February 10, 1938The king forced Prime Minister Octavian Goga to resign after just 44 days in office. On the night of February 10 to 11, Carol II formed a personal government led by Patriarch Miron Cristea, a symbolic choice intended to confer religious legitimacy to the new regime.
   
   The Constitution of February 27, 1938 fundamentally transformed the structure of the Romanian state. Legislative power was dramatically reduced, with the parliament becoming a consultative body.
   
   The king received the right to issue decrees with the force of law and to appoint and dismiss ministers at his discretion. The political party system was abolished, being replaced by National Renaissance Fronta corporate organization directly controlled by the Crown.
8. In April 1938The Carlist regime launched a systematic campaign against the Legionary Movement.
   
   Corneliu Zelea Codreanu was arrested on charges of treason. His trial, conducted in haste, was based on the accusation of committing an offense against a public official in the exercise of their duties (based on a response to his criticism). Nicolae Iorga).
   
   Initially, he was sentenced to 6 months of detention. In May 1938, he was retried and sentenced to 10 years of hard labor, which was just the beginning. On the night of November 29-30, 1938Codreanu and 13 other legionary leaders were assassinated during an alleged "transfer between prisons."
   
   The assassination was orchestrated by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Armand Călinescu, with the direct approval of the king. The bodies were buried in the courtyard of Jilava prison and covered with concrete to prevent the site from becoming a pilgrimage point.
9. In 1939, After the assassination of Codreanu, the Legionary Movement entered a period of profound transformation under his leadership. Horia SimaFrom Germany, where he had sought refuge, Sima reorganized the movement on strictly conspiratorial principles. The "nest" structure was adapted for clandestine activity, with small, compartmentalized cells to reduce the risk of infiltration.
   
   On September 21, 1939, a team of six legionnaires led by lawyer Dumitru (Miti) Dumitrescu assassinated the prime minister. Armand Călinescu in the Elefterie Bridge area of Bucharest, after their car was bumped.
   
   Twenty-one shots were fired, three of which penetrated the skull. After the attack, the team issued a statement on the radio announcing revenge for Codreanu's death, and then surrendered to the authorities.
   
   The response of the Carolist regime was unprecedented in scale: the nine members of Dumitrescu's team were executed immediately and displayed publicly.
   
   The following day, by order of King Carol II transmitted through Ernest Urdăreanu147 legionnaires were executed (usually three from each county) along with 95 legionary commanders already in detention camps.
   
   In total, 252 people were executed without trial, and many of the corpses were displayed publicly with the inscription "Traitor to the country." However, this show of force had the opposite effect than intended, intensifying hostility towards the Carolist regime.
10. June-September 1940: The summer of 1940 brought Romania to the brink of territorial disintegration. On June 26, the USSR issued an ultimatum demanding the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.
    
    In August, the Vienna Dictate forced the cession of Northern Transylvania to Hungary. In early September, similar pressures led to the cession of the Quadrilateral to Bulgaria.
    
    These catastrophic territorial losses completely undermined the legitimacy of the Carolist regime. Street protests paralyzed Bucharest. In this context, General Ion Antonescu, supported by the army and enjoying the confidence of Nazi Germany, forced King Carol II to abdicate on September 6, 1940.
11. From September 1940 to January 1941The new regime, known as the National-Legionary State, represented an unprecedented alliance between the professional military led by Antonescu and Horia Sima's legionaries. Antonescu assumed the title of Leader of the State, while Sima became the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.
    
    The period was marked by rising tensions between the two components of the regime. The Legionnaires launched a campaign of "Romanization" of the economy, expropriating Jewish businesses and redistributing them to members of the movement. They organized raids and arbitrary searches, took control of the press, and instituted a regime of terror in many state institutions.
12. The conflict between Antonescu and the Legionnaires culminated in January 1941On January 20, a German officer was found dead in the Băneasa forest. Antonescu used the incident to initiate the removal of legionnaires from key positions in administration and police.
    
    The Legionary Rebellion of January 21-23, 1941, represented the last attempt of the movement to retain power. The Legionnaires occupied important institutions in Bucharest and other cities, initiated a pogrom against the Jews in the capital, and attempted to take control of the army. With the explicit support of Hitler, who needed stability in Romania in light of the impending invasion of the USSR, Antonescu used the army to crush the rebellion.
    
    As a result of these events, the Legionary Movement was definitively removed from power. Many leaders, including Horia Sima, fled to Germany, while thousands of members were arrested. Romania entered a new phase in its history, under the military dictatorship of Ion Antonescu.
13. After the removal of the Legionnaires in January 1941Romania enters a new phase under the leadership of Ion Antonescu. In June 1941, the country joins the war alongside Nazi Germany against the USSR, initially managing to reclaim Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Antonescu decides to continue the campaign beyond the Dniester, engaging Romania in a costly war that will lead to massive losses at Odessa and Stalingrad.
14. The period from 1941 to 1944 is characterized by an efficient yet authoritarian military administration.with the economy completely subordinated to the war effort. Romania becomes the main supplier of oil for Germany, and the German presence in the economy increases significantly. In the recaptured territories and in Transnistria, the Romanian administration implements severe anti-Semitic policies, resulting in deportations and loss of life.
15. After the disaster at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943It is evident that Germany will lose the war. However, Antonescu refuses to accept reality and keeps Romania in alliance with Hitler. This leads to the act of August 23, 1944, when King Michael, supported by the democratic parties and the army, arrests Antonescu and turns the weapons against Germany.
16. Romania in the years 1944-1947 enters a process of forced transformation under the pressure of Soviet presence. The population, exhausted by war and impoverished by military efforts, becomes vulnerable to the communists' promises of social reform.
    
    The peasants, who make up the majority of the population, are initially drawn by the promise of land reform. Urban workers, faced with rampant inflation and post-war unemployment, see the communists as a hope for better working conditions.
17. In 1948-1952Under the leadership of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the communist regime implements radical transformations that will shape society for decades.
    
    The nationalization of industry and the onset of agricultural collectivization are destroying the traditional structure of Romanian society. The old elites are being eliminated through deportations, imprisonment, and forced labor. This is the period when the seeds of future social tensions are sown: peasants lose their land, small traders lose their businesses, and intellectuals lose their freedom of expression.
18. 1952-1958 marks the period of harsh Stalinism in Romania. The regime uses terror to consolidate its power, but paradoxically, this terror also creates the first forms of passive resistance among the population.
    
    A parallel informal economy is developing, based on personal relationships and barter, in response to the deficiencies of the planned economy. This period leaves behind an important behavioral pattern: distrust in authorities and the development of informal survival networks.
    
19. Period 1958-1965 There is a relative relaxation under Gheorghiu-Dej. The withdrawal of Soviet troops allows the regime to develop a form of "national communism." Accelerated industrialization creates a new urban working class, detached from rural roots.
    
    This divide between urban and rural will become a defining characteristic of Romanian society, fueling social tensions that persist to this day.
20. His arrival Nicolae Ceaușescu at the power of 1965 This was initially received with hope. The period 1965-1971 represents the pinnacle of communist "liberalization" in Romania.
    
    The relaxation of ideological control and the opening towards the West allow for the development of an educated urban middle class. This is the period when the illusion forms that the communist regime can be reformed from within.
21. "The July theses" din 1971 marks the beginning of a new era of ideological control. Ceaușescu, impressed by Asian-communist models, begins to construct a cult of personality that will reach grotesque proportions. Society starts to polarize between the privileged nomenclature and the rest of the population facing increasing hardships.
22. Anii 1974-1980 the first signs of the economic crisis. Ceaușescu's megalomaniac projects (the People's House, urban systematization) consume vast resources while the standard of living declines. Paradoxically, it is precisely this period of "glory" of the cult of personality that lays the groundwork for the subsequent collapse of the regime.
23. 1980-1989 This represents the harshest period for the population. Food rationing, power outages, and lack of heating during winter create a widespread sense of discontent. The regime responds by intensifying control and repression, alienating even the old supporters among the workers.
    
    This constant deterioration of living conditions, combined with international isolation and the leadership's megalomania, explains the violent nature of the regime's downfall in December 1989.
    
24. The December 1989 Revolutionavoids a period of dramatic transformations in Romanian society.
    
    The early years, 1990-1992, are marked by political violence and instability. The phenomenon of miners' protests, particularly the one from June 13-15, 1990, reveals the fragility of the new democracy.
    
    The National Salvation Front, led by Ion Iliescu, takes control of state institutions but faces increasingly vocal opposition from the emerging civil society.
25. In the period from 1992 to 1996, Romania is experiencing a form of "wild capitalism." The privatization method known as MEBO (Management Employee Buy Out) is creating a new class of owners, but many enterprises are being systematically looted.
    
    Galloping inflation is eroding the savings of the population, while unemployment is dramatically rising with the closure of major industrial plants. The first financial "empires" are forming based on privileged relationships with the state, a phenomenon known as "crony capitalism."
26. Period 1996-2000 introduce the first democratic alternation in power through victory CDRThe center-right government is accelerating economic reforms, but the social cost is dramatic.
    
    The restructuring of the mining industry is causing major social tensions. Romania is applying for membership in the EU and NATO, decisively orienting itself towards the West. However, governmental instability and the inability to effectively manage the transition are leading to a severe economic crisis.
27. Anii 2000-2004 represents a period of relative stabilization under the PSD government. It lays the groundwork for subsequent economic growth through structural reforms and the initiation of concrete negotiations for EU accession.
    
    However, systemic corruption and political clientelism are becoming institutionalized, creating power structures that will endure for a long time.
28. Between 2004-2007, Romania is accelerating its preparations for EU accession. Judicial reform and the fight against corruption are gaining substance with the establishment of the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). The economy is experiencing remarkable growth, fueled by foreign investments and massive lending.
    
    A new urban middle class is emerging, particularly in large cities, creating an increasing gap with rural areas.
29. Period 2007-2009 marks the accession to the EU and the pre-crisis economic boom. Romania seems to have definitively embarked on the path of Western modernization. However, the economic boom is largely based on consumption and speculative investments, especially in the real estate sector.
30. The economic crisis of 2009 It represented the first major breaking point in post-accession Romanian society. The austerity measures of the Boc government affected different social categories in various ways.
    
    The 25% reduction in public sector salaries and the increase in VAT to 24% have severely impacted the urban middle class. In contrast, these measures had a lesser effect on the already impoverished rural areas, where the informal economy and subsistence farming prevail.
    
    This different experience of the crisis has created the first major rift between "productive Romania" and "assisted Romania," narratives that will be politically exploited in the coming years.
31. The Roșia Montană Case (2013) The division between two visions of development has deepened. On one hand, project supporters argued for the necessity of economic development and job creation.
    
    On the other hand, the massive protests against cyanide exploitation have mobilized a new generation of urban activists, educated and with environmental values. The conflict quickly transcended the specific issue, evolving into a confrontation between "modernity" and "tradition," between economic development and environmental protection.
32. Colectiv Tragedy (2015) The brutal exposure of systemic corruption and the dysfunctions of the state. The subsequent protests revealed a new division: between those demanding radical reforms and accelerated "Europeanization" and those who viewed these demands as a form of "Western colonialism."
    
    The construction of the Cathedral of the Salvation of the Nation, instead of building hospitals, has become symbolically associated with resistance to modernization, transforming the Romanian Orthodox Church into an adversary of those oriented towards progress.
33. Period 2017-2019Marked by the #Rezist protests against changes to the justice laws, ideological polarization has crystallized. The anti-corruption discourse has intertwined with a pro-Western agenda, while the opposing camp has developed nationalist, anti-EU, and anti-corporate rhetoric. Social media has amplified this polarization, creating separate "information bubbles."
34. The 2018 Family Referendum It transformed latent tensions into open conflict over social values. Although the low voter turnout led to the invalidation of the referendum, the moment marked the beginning of a deep division between social conservatives and progressives.
    
    The Orthodox Church and conservative organizations have become more vocal in their opposition to the "LGBT agenda" and "gender ideology," viewed as harmful Western imports.
35. COVID-19 Pandemic (2020-2022) The dramatic deepening of these divisions. The restrictions have been interpreted differently: necessary for public health versus violations of individual freedom.
    
    The vaccination campaign has become a new front of conflict, with dramatically different vaccination rates between urban and rural areas, reflecting the level of trust in institutions and science. Conspiracy theories have proliferated, fueling anti-establishment and anti-Western sentiments.
    
    The lack of transparency from public institutions, along with authoritarian behavior in favor of a persuasive policy, has generated hatred towards the political class and distrust in the democratic character of the country.
36. The War in Ukraine (2022-present) It exposed hidden vulnerabilities of Romanian society. While Romania officially supports Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, a significant portion of the population shares pro-Russian narratives about the "decadence of the West" and "traditional values." The rise in energy prices and inflation have fueled populist and anti-EU rhetoric.

The social dynamics that have divided society

The context of 2024 is defined by four overlapping and mutually amplifying major crises: the post-pandemic economic crisis, the energy crisis, inflation, and the geopolitical uncertainty generated by the war in Ukraine. These crises have exacerbated existing social divisions and created new fault lines in Romanian society.

Urban-Rural Polarization

The first and most evident divide remains between urban and rural environments, but with new nuances in 2024. Major cities, especially Bucharest, Cluj, Timișoara, and Iași, have continued to develop at an accelerated pace, attracting investments in the IT sector, services, and creative industries. Salaries in these areas have risen significantly above the national average, creating what sociologists refer to as "islands of prosperity."

In contrast, rural Romania faces exacerbated structural issues: an aging population, youth migration, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to medical and educational services. The pandemic has accelerated this gap by shifting to online education, which has significantly disadvantaged students in rural areas with limited access to technology.

Generational Tension

The second major divide is generational, more pronounced than ever in 2024. The young generation (ages 18-35) is the first to be fully raised in capitalism with unrestricted access to technology and information. This generation has fundamentally different expectations and values compared to previous generations:

• Prioritize flexibility and work-life balance over stability
• It is more concerned with global issues such as climate change.
• A more pronounced pro-Western orientation
• It is less attached to traditional values and institutions such as the Church.
• It is more open to experimenting and reaffirming its values, which has led to various "woke" trends.

In contrast, older generations tend to be more socially conservative, more skeptical of rapid changes, and more attached to traditional values. This difference is directly reflected in political preferences and visions for the country's future.

Economic Clivage

The third level of polarization is the economic one, which in 2024 is taking on new forms. High inflation and the rising cost of living have disproportionately affected the emerging middle class. A clearer division is becoming evident between:

• A small economic elite that has benefited from the opportunities created by crises, as well as from a corrupt political environment that has provided them with a safety net.
• An urban middle class under pressure, whose standard of living is threatened, despite their significant efforts.
• A large segment of the population with modest incomes, reliant on social assistance and remittances, without a social system that encourages their independence, thereby reducing the pressure on the social system.

This economic stratification fuels social tensions and political radicalism on both sides of the ideological spectrum.

The Pro-West vs. Sovereignty Debate

The pro-Western orientation of Romania, long considered a national consensus, has become a subject of debate. The "sovereigntist" discourse is gaining traction, promoting the idea that Romania should follow its own path of development, independent of the "Western dictate," which is viewed as responsible for Romania's precarious social state.

This debate manifests in multiple forms:

• Critics of "corporatocracy" and foreign investments
• Opposition to the Green Deal and energy transition
• Challenging the benefits of European integration
• The promotion of economic protectionism

Social Media and Information Bubbles

Social media has become the primary source of information for many Romanians, leading to the formation of distinct "information bubbles." The algorithms of these platforms tend to amplify polarizing content and reinforce existing biases.

In Romania, this phenomenon has led to the formation of parallel realities:

• "Progressive bulge" - predominantly urban, educated, pro-EU
• "Conservative bulwark" - oriented towards traditional values, skeptical of globalization
• "Conspiracy-minded" - anti-establishment, influenced by conspiracy theories

These informational bubbles have become so distinct that members of different groups operate with completely different sets of "facts" and interpretations of reality.

The impact of the system and emotional voting

The deep dissatisfaction of the population with the political class has its roots in Romania's post-December history. Corruption scandals, from the dubious privatizations of the '90s to high-level corruption cases in the 2000s, have consistently eroded trust in politicians. Meanwhile, the poor quality of public services - health, infrastructure, bureaucracy - has fueled the perception that the state does not serve the interests of its citizens.

The recent overlap of the pandemic, inflation, and the energy crisis has exacerbated these pre-existing grievances. The authorities' response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been a major factor in eroding public trust in state institutions.

Poor management of the SARS-COV-2 pandemic

The authorities' response to the COVID-19 pandemic was a major factor in eroding public trust in state institutions. Many of the restrictive measures, although justified from a public health perspective, were perceived by a significant portion of the population as excessive, inconsistent, and even abusive.

The closure of schools and the shift to online education have had a negative impact on the quality of education and the mental health of children. Travel restrictions and the shutdown of businesses have disproportionately affected micro-enterprises and independent workers. Poor communication and seemingly contradictory decisions by authorities have contributed to the erosion of public trust.

Theories of conspiracy and misinformation have found fertile ground in this climate of distrust. False narratives about the origin of the virus, hidden interests behind restrictions, or exaggerated risks of vaccines have circulated widely on social media, reinforcing skepticism and resistance to measures.

While the political class responsible for managing the pandemic has struggled to articulate a post-factum analysis of institutional failures, citizens have endured indifference, a curtailment of their rights with little explanation, and behavior characteristic of a police state.

Vulnerability to populist and radical rhetoric

The context of widespread dissatisfaction and distrust in institutions has created fertile ground for populist and radical rhetoric. Politicians and movements that promise simple solutions to complex problems and blame "elites" or external forces for the country's difficulties have gained significant traction during this period.

The recurring theme in these speeches is the idea of a "Sorosist" elite that allegedly controls state institutions from the shadows and works for foreign interests, undermining Romania's sovereignty and traditional values. This narrative has resonated with segments of the population already dissatisfied with the direction the country is heading and suspicious of external influences.

Populist politicians presented themselves as defenders of national interest, fighting against the "corrupt system" and "foreign agendas." They promised to "return Romania to Romanians," to protect traditional values, and to put an end to "social experiments" imposed from abroad. This rhetoric resonated particularly well with more conservative and less educated segments of society.

Excessive focus on the "Soros conspiracy" or other theories about "globalist forces" risks distracting attention from Romania's real structural problems - endemic corruption, weak institutions, and uneven development - and may hinder constructive dialogue about solutions.

While it is true that foreign institutions exert a form of control over Romania, they do so only as long as they are permitted by the Romanian state, which derives benefits from these partnerships.

NGOs, although often funded from abroad, do nothing but diversify public discourse, a useful aspect for democracy.

An underdeveloped energy system

The energy sector in Romania faces the dual challenge of ensuring supply security while navigating the transition to a low-carbon future. Currently, Romania's energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, and production has declined in recent years, leading to an increasing dependence on imports, primarily from Russia.

The energy infrastructure of Romania is aging and requires significant investments. Many coal-fired power plants are nearing the end of their operational lifespan, and the distribution networks suffer from high losses and low efficiency. Romania's energy policy is shaped by a complex interplay of domestic politics, EU regulations, and geopolitical factors.

The transition to a low-carbon energy system has significant social and economic implications. The coal sector directly employs approximately 15,000 people and indirectly supports many others.

The rising cost of energy is another key concern, with a significant portion of the population struggling to pay their energy bills and maintain adequate heating during the winter. For industry, the cost and reliability of energy supply are critical competitive factors.

Presidential campaign and pre-campaign in the region

Electoral campaigns have historically been, in all states, periods of polarization - times when the population is asked to decide who is most suitable for the country from a series of candidates.

During a campaign, politicians are allowed to lie (electoral propaganda is permitted), make unrealistic promises, polarize the population with anti-X rhetoric, and ultimately do what they believe will increase their chances of winning the race.

Unlike most elections, there are a few aspects that need to be noted before we draw conclusions:

• This year (2024) has represented a year in which the elections in many states have overlappedand, due to the globalization and the real influence that the politics of other countries have on the values in Romania, it has influenced political discourse as well as public opinions.
  
  This year, enormous sums of money have been spent to persuade the electorate regarding values and non-values, which have succeeded in polarizing the population even before the campaign period began in Romania.
  
  Anti-LGBT, anti-Russia, anti-West, anti-East rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and distrust have already reached a peak, without any direct influence, simply because the world is more connected than ever - the speeches of Trump, Biden, or the situation in Ukraine are known to all of us today, even if we do not speak their native languages.
  
  "Globalism" refers to this, and everyone, whether pro or anti-globalism, has been influenced by it - the situation in other countries has been imported here.
• The voting options were VERY weak, and a significant segment of the population has given up on dreaming: Two important phenomena have become very relevant in the current elections. Firstly, none of the main presidential candidates were viewed favorably.
  
  Mircea Geoana was a renowned figure "Prostanacul" and was associated with the PSD, having led this party in the past.
  
  George Simion was known for his violent outburst in parliament, where he threatened Diana Ivanovici Sosoaca, and was a Rom - an aspect that for many Romanians signifies a direct disqualification. Furthermore, he was portrayed as a pro-Russian extremist, which damaged his appeal to the electorate aspiring towards the West.
  
  Marcel Ciolacu yes Nicolae Ciuca They refused to participate in most presidential debates, ran weak, traditional campaigns (Nicolae Ciuca's book, paid television appearances that lacked substance), and trust in the parties that provided them with a serious voter base has significantly decreased.
  
  Elena Lasconi She was considered incompetent, frequently stammering in public speeches, and was seen as a hypocrite. Although she voted "YES" in the family referendum, she was portrayed as the harbinger of the LGBT agenda in Romania.
  
  Less well-known candidates were simply ignored by the electorate focused on progress (who voted for Elena Lasconi, and some with Mircea Geoanadue to the concept of "tactical voting," which effectively eliminated candidates such as Diaconescu, Birchall, Pregnant, etc.
  
  In short, the options were weak, which lowered the standard used by voters to filter the quality of candidates.

The consequences of dissatisfaction with the principal candidates led to a protest vote for lesser-known candidates who proposed quick solutions, a unifying discourse, and called for unity rather than division, and who possessed the credentials and rhetoric associated with intellectualism.

Thus, the candidate Calin GeorgescuThe speeches, which were not ones of hatred but rather of promoting love and mutual respect, managed to convince enough voters in the first round to become an anomaly too difficult for the electorate, the press, and political parties to ignore.

This vote, partly a protest and partly based on trust from a few seconds of speeches on TikTok, secured the candidate's position. over 2.1 million votes.

Expert Forum Reports - A Commented Analysis

From the initial reports of Expert Forum, we can see the results and the influence of TikTok on the elections in the first round.

Contrary to public statements, Calin Georgescu was NOT the leading figure as presented on TikTok; this title belongs to him. George Simion yes Marcel Ciolacuboth having more than double the number of views of Calin Georgescu.

Unlike Calin Georgescu, candidates Marcel Ciolacu, Elena Lasconi, and George Simion were already heavily disparaged in the public sphere, which made Calin Georgescu, with no known prior issues, appear to be a more appealing solution.

Moreover, they employed traditional strategies rather than a coordination group on Telegram, in an MLM-style approach. The same recruitment strategy of a group of "volunteers" to redistribute videos on TikTok led to the virality of "Andrew Tate" on YouTube Shorts and TikTok, where these volunteers (in his case, students from his business academy) effectively promoted his courses for a commission.

Strategies of this kind are completely legal, and we see no legal issues regarding their use. The necessity of employing a CMF is debatable, given that volunteers do not directly represent the candidate's campaign, are not compensated with funds that will later be reimbursed by the Romanian state, and, except during the electoral propaganda ban period, are legally allowed to conduct such advertising.

Furthermore, the Expert Forum indicates that the distribution of views was concentrated among a few accounts, with three main accounts heavily favored by the algorithm.

The difference shows that certain variables (account age, use of viewing bots, etc.) distinguish these 3 accounts from the others, which had significantly fewer views.

The price in the black market for 1,000,000 views is approximately 5-10 EUR; however, we have no concrete evidence that they used such bots, which are more likely to be discussed in the case of other candidates with significantly more views but a much weaker real-world impact.

Recounting of votes requested by the Constitutional Court - What does it tell us?

At the request of the Constitutional Court, the Central Electoral Bureau ordered a recount of all votes, and after the recount of votes in the country, they provided the following report, which will be analyzed below by AI:

Conclusions of the AI model:

It is evident that the model did not have access to the analysis methodology, but rather concludes solely based on how the document was drafted and what it states. We do not agree with the AI model regarding the ad-hoc methodology that was employed, which disregards several recommendations from the Venice Commission.

However, the errors were detrimental to supporting the outcome of the first round, as they increased the risk of incorrect recounting and did not provide transparency. Additionally, they reduced the chances of correctly identifying criminal acts (e.g., electoral fraud).

The re-registration from the Diaspora was not requested; trust in embassies, which are significantly more professional than the BESVs, is higher. Moreover, the diaspora consistently votes for anti-establishment parties and candidates, so it was clear that the final would be Lasconi against Georgescu.

CSAT Reports - What Do They Tell Us?

Another particularly relevant aspect is what emerges from the declassified reports prepared by the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) at the request of several NGOs, including Expert Forum, which can be found above.

To avoid forming biased opinions, I let an AI model (Claude 3.5 Sonnet) analyze and fact-check them. Although I do not agree with all the conclusions (e.g., the minimal effect of Telegram channels), I believe an AI model can minimize bias while logical errors are equivalent to a person with medium to high knowledge in the applicable fields.

Used format:

• At the top, after the title, there is the perspective of Claude 3.5 Sonnet (the latest model) regarding the document's value as evidence.
• Furthermore, we can find photographs of each page of the CSAT report for readers to analyze.
• Furthermore, we reaffirm the statements made, as well as the fact-check conducted by Claude 3.5 Sonnet.
• In the end, we find a quote (or conclusion) provided by the AI model regarding the analyzed document.

The first report from the SRI regarding Calin Georgescu's campaign:

The AI analysis conducted on this report reveals the following:

FIRST SRI DOCUMENT (TikTok) presents a detailed analysis of an online influence campaign. Although it identifies suspicious patterns and unusual increases in popularity, the document cannot definitively establish a causal link between these activities and vote manipulation.

This is rather evidence of the increasing sophistication of digital influence campaigns and the necessity for better regulations in this field.

The second report from the SRI regarding Calin Georgescu's campaign:

THE DOILEA DOCUMENT SRI (cyber attacks) This is more specific regarding direct threats to electoral infrastructure. It demonstrates the existence of coordinated attempts to compromise the systems, while also showing that security measures have been effective.

This is a document that paradoxically strengthens trust in the electoral system, demonstrating its resilience.

The SIE report regarding Calin Georgescu's campaign:

YOUR DOCUMENT provides the broadest strategic context. It places events in Romania within a larger pattern of electoral interference on a global scale. Its main value lies in identifying the methods and tactics used in other countries and how they have been adapted for Romania.

It is important to note that this document does not make definitive claims about election manipulation, but rather identifies potential risks and vulnerabilities.

The DGPI report regarding Calin Georgescu's campaign:

DGPI DOCUMENT focuses on the tactical aspects of influence campaigns. Although it identifies multiple suspicious patterns and connections between different campaigns, it largely remains at a circumstantial level.

The main value lies in documenting the specific methods used in attempts to influence public opinion.

The STS report regarding Calin Georgescu's campaign:

STS DOCUMENT This is probably the most technical and revealing of all. It demonstrates that Romania has a modern and resilient digital electoral system, with multiple levels of security and verification. The implementation of blockchain for result verification is particularly important, providing an additional level of safety.

The document indicates that there were attempts to compromise the system, but these were detected and blocked. More importantly, the document demonstrates that there is complete traceability of the electronic vote, allowing for independent verification of the results.

The impact of the media on results

In the post-mortem analysis of the results from the first round, the press uncovered pro-legionary speeches (though lacking their violent character), conspiracy claims (The juice contains microchips), as well as pseudo-scientific theories (e.g., "Water is information").

The speeches, reminiscent of the interwar period, have intensely frightened the representatives of the press and manifested themselves in derogatory articles that not only presented the candidate's problematic statements but also began to attack him unfoundedly.

The propaganda team of Calin Georgescu, gathered on #propagatorcg (a Telegram group where they coordinated with individuals distributing messages/videos about Georgescu), managed to refute some information, leading to distrust in the media, which in turn made it impossible to inform the public through the press, which has become discredited.

The team at PropagatorCG was indeed responsible for some of the press failures; they quickly removed the incriminating content from Telegram and denied the previously spread and promoted information by them, to create the impression that the candidate is being subjected to a media lynching without any basis in truth.

Television stations such as RealitateaTV, which are in the minority for interviewing and supporting the candidate Calin Georgescu they were also heavily sanctioned, threatened due to their association with him.

The entire picture of a poor candidate, or at least one visibly less arrogant than the others, who is besieged by a system that Romanians already perceive as corrupt, has transformed him into a true Messiah.

On the other side of the barricade, the pro-European electorate harshly sanctioned the voters of this candidate, criticizing them with sharp attacks on character. The violent manner in which they addressed Georgescu's supporters only alienated them further and clearly did nothing but reinforce their distrust in publicly available information.

For example, here are a few articles that have been published:

The recipe for Călin Georgescu's bots: how he gained 4.5 million views in a day on a new account - Snoop

A digital marketing and cybersecurity expert has identified over 100 fake accounts on the first video of the new TikTok profile used by the independent candidate. He demonstrates the entire process, from the creation of fake accounts to the rapid increase in views, comments, and likes. This is just one of the tactics employed for online growth in recent weeks.

SnoopRăzvan Luțac

Călin Georgescu says that juices contain "nanocchips that enter you like into a laptop."

Călin Georgescu, the winner of the first round of the presidential elections, stated a month ago that carbonated drinks contain nanocchips that invade our bodies when we consume them.

Digi24Ștefania Apostol

Stunning dialogue about Putin, aliens, and Soros between Călin Georgescu and a British reporter. "Have you seen what Covid looks like?"

Călin Georgescu stated in an interview with the British broadcaster Sky News that "Soros's last stronghold has fallen," in response to the investigation initiated by the General Prosecutor's Office following the declassification of CSAT documents regarding the funding of his campaign...

Digi24Mihnea Lazăr

Călin Georgescu, accompanied by the leader of the neo-legionary movement in Romania, appeared on a show where he denied any connections to the legionary movement.

The presidential candidate Călin Georgescu was accompanied by Eugen Sechila, leader of the neo-Legionary movement, during Tuesday evening's broadcast of the online publication Gândul, where he denied any connection to the Legionary movement, reports Hotnews.ro, which also provides images from the event.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Romania (RFE/RL)Dora Vulcan

Georgescu disavows legionnaires and extremists, despite having declared admiration for Zelea Codreanu and Marshal Antonescu. He even plagiarized the latter in his speech.

Călin Georgescu denied any association with the ideas of the Legionary Movement or extremist views. However, his previous statements praising the Legionary Movement and its leader, Corneliu Codreanu,…

euronews.ro: Latest news, breaking news, #AllViewsPublished by: Sabina Coman Published on: 04/12/2024, 09:52 • Updated on: 04/12/2024, 11:46 Share this news

Decisions of the Constitutional Court and annulment of elections

Following the unexpected results of the first round and the unusual nature of candidate Calin Georgescu's campaign, there have been several attempts to annul the elections, which we will describe below.

Their competence is revealed both in the traditional sense of the CCR's (Constitutional Court's) authority and in the way they have approached the crisis. For clarity, I have also mentioned the solution for rejecting the candidacy of Ms. Diana Ivanovici Sosoaca:

Decision 2/2024, invalidating the candidacy of Ms. Diana Ivanovici Sosoaca:

The context of the case and the subject of the notification

On October 4, 2024, Amalia Bellantoni and Mihai Gheorghe Ursa filed two challenges with the Constitutional Court against the registration of Diana Iovanovici-Șoșoacă's candidacy for the presidential elections. The challenges addressed both formal aspects regarding the supporter lists and substantive issues related to the candidate's behavior, statements, and actions.

Main arguments of the challengers

The challengers argued that this candidacy violates the fundamental values and principles of the Romanian state. Firstly, they cited concrete actions of the candidate in relation to the Russian Federation, including participation in receptions at the Embassy, public apologies for anti-Russian protests, and meetings with the Russian ambassador regarding Romania's neutrality. Behaviorally, the challengers highlighted serious incidents such as the assault and deprivation of liberty of RAI Uno journalists, as well as public statements discrediting NATO and the EU. Additionally, specific anti-democratic actions were indicated, such as incitement to revolt in the context of the pandemic and the obstruction of a vaccination center.

Procedure before the Constitutional Court and the reasoning applied

The Court conducted an analysis on two levels. The first focused on verifying the fulfillment of the formal eligibility conditions explicitly provided in the Constitution and law. The second level, more controversial, involved analyzing substantive conditions that the Court inferred from the constitutional oath - namely, the obligation to respect the Constitution and defend democracy. The Court's reasoning started from the premise that these obligations are not mere aspirations, but rather essential eligibility conditions that can be evaluated, including through the lens of the candidate's previous behavior.

Sample Analysis and Solution

The court examined a complex set of evidence consisting of public statements, participation in official events, and concrete actions of the candidate. These were evaluated as a whole to determine whether they demonstrate the capacity and willingness to uphold constitutional values. Ultimately, the court upheld the appeals and annulled the BEC's decision to register the candidacy, noting that through her consistent behavior, the candidate demonstrated that she does not meet the substantive constitutional requirements.

Relevant procedural aspects and controversies

The decision marks a significant expansion of the Court's jurisdiction regarding the validation of presidential candidacies. Procedurally, the absence of a complete adversarial debate and the candidate's inability to present their defenses are noteworthy. Judge Laura-Iuliana Scântei issued a separate opinion in which she challenged the Court's authority to impose unexpressed eligibility conditions and argued that the procedure should remain objective and formal.

The implications of the decision

The decision establishes important precedents for future presidential elections. It enshrines adherence to the Constitution as an implicit eligibility requirement and allows for the assessment of candidates' past behavior. Additionally, it marks the existence of constitutional limits on the right to be elected and the possibility for the Constitutional Court to conduct a substantial analysis of candidacies, beyond the formally stipulated legal criteria.

Decision 29/2024, the appeal of Sebastian-Constantin Popescu:

The context and subject of the case

On November 27, 2024, Sebastian-Constantin Popescu submitted a request to the Constitutional Court to annul the first round of the presidential elections held on November 24, 2024.

The visa application primarily contests the electoral campaign and the result obtained by independent candidate Călin Georgescu, who garnered over 2.1 million votes.

The main arguments of the appellant

The contestant raised several problematic issues regarding the independent candidate's campaign.

First of all, a major discrepancy was noted between the scale of the online campaign and the financial statements - the candidate reported zero lei in expenses to the Permanent Electoral Authority.

Secondly, he accused the use of artificial intelligence to manipulate public perception by automatically generating comments on social platforms such as TikTok and YouTube.

Lastly, it was asserted that there exists a coordinated network of "influencers" who promoted the candidate without disclosing paid political advertising.

Position of the Public Ministry

The representative of the Public Ministry requested the rejection of the application as unfounded, arguing that not every violation of electoral legislation constitutes fraud in the sense of Article 52 of Law 370/2004.

According to this, only those violations that directly affect the outcome of the elections can be considered electoral fraud.

The Court's Decision and Rationale

The Constitutional Court rejected the request as untimely, without further examining the substance of the issues raised.

The motivation was based on the exceeding of the legal contestation period of 3 days from the closing of the voting, a period that expired on November 26, 2024, at 24:00. The request was registered on November 27, thus after the expiration of this period, the Court could no longer analyze the substantive issues raised.

Identified Implications and Issues

The case raises numerous questions about the adaptation of the Romanian electoral system to the digital age.

The reported issues - from the use of artificial intelligence in campaigns to the opaque funding of online promotion - highlight the need to update the legislative framework.

Furthermore, the case underscores the importance of strict adherence to procedural deadlines in electoral matters, as these are imperative and of public order.

Conclusions and Perspectives

Although formally correct from a legal standpoint, the rejection as untimely left substantial aspects regarding the integrity of the modern electoral process unexamined.

The issue raised by this case could serve as a starting point for a broader debate on the need to modernize electoral legislation to address the challenges of the digital age.

In particular, issues such as the regulation of artificial intelligence use in electoral campaigns, transparency in online funding, and the establishment of effective mechanisms for monitoring digital campaigns should be addressed.

Decision 30/2024, the appeal of Cristian-Vasile Terhes regarding the first round

The context of the case and the subject of the notification

On November 26, 2024, Cristian-Vasile Terheș submitted a request to the Constitutional Court to annul the first round of the presidential elections held on November 24, 2024. The challenger, who received 95,782 votes (1.04% of the total valid votes cast), alleged the existence of electoral fraud that would have altered the order of candidates for the second round.

The arguments of the appellant and the evidence submitted

Terheș reported several irregularities. The first concerned the illegal continuation of the electoral campaign online on November 23-24, including on election day. The second involved the use of bots and automated mechanisms to promote candidate Călin Georgescu. The third referred to an alleged fraudulent transfer of votes from candidate Ludovic Orban to Elena-Valerica Lasconi in three polling stations. He also cited the existence of a disproportionate number of null votes (223,132) compared to the difference between candidates, as well as irregular voting on supplementary lists.

Procedure before the Constitutional Court

Although the legal procedure stipulated resolution by November 29, the Court went through several stages. On November 28, it ordered, through a ruling, the re-examination and recounting of all ballots. On November 29, it noted that the recounting process was ongoing. On December 2, with the partial results of the recount, it proceeded to the final resolution of the case.

Analysis of samples and the checks performed

CCR received from the Central Electoral Bureau the results of the recount of votes from the country and partially from abroad. It was found that there are no significant differences compared to the initial results. Additionally, the CSAT statement regarding potential cyberattacks was analyzed, as well as the clarifications from STS confirming that there were no influences on the electoral process.

The Arguments of the Public Ministry

The representative of the Public Ministry requested the rejection of the application as unfounded, stating that not every violation of electoral law constitutes fraud in the sense of Article 52 of Law 370/2004. He argued that only those violations that are capable of affecting the determination of election results can be considered fraud.

The CCR solution and its justification

The court rejected the request as unfounded, noting that the identified deficiencies are organizational and administrative in nature, without affecting the election results. It was established that no fraud was identified in the voting process and the determination of results, and the recount of votes did not confirm the claims regarding fraudulent vote transfers.

Separate opinions

Judge Elena Simina Tănăsescu noted that the request should be dismissed as inadmissible, citing a lack of procedural interest, lack of motivation, and failure to prove fraud. Judge Laura-Iuliana Scântei believed that the request should be dismissed as unfounded without ordering a recount of the votes, a measure she deemed excessive and disproportionate.

Questionable procedural aspects

The decision raises questions regarding the appropriateness of exceeding the legal deadline for resolution and the proportionality of the total recount measure in relation to the evidence presented. It also discusses the nature of the electoral dispute (objective or subjective) and the evidentiary standard required to prove electoral fraud.

Relevant legal particulars

The decision highlights the tension between the need for a swift resolution of electoral disputes and the imperative of thoroughly verifying allegations of fraud. At the same time, it develops the interpretation of the concept of electoral fraud, establishing that it must be of a nature that effectively alters the election results, rather than merely constituting procedural violations.

Decision 31/2024 for the VALIDATION of the first round of presidential elections

The context and purpose of validation

On December 2, 2024, the Constitutional Court of Romania was called to rule on the validation of the results of the first round of the presidential elections held on November 24. This decision came after the Court had previously resolved two challenges regarding the annulment of the elections, dismissing Sebastian-Constantin Popescu's challenge as untimely and Cristian-Vasile Terheș's as unfounded.

Validation procedure and election figures

On November 26, BEC submitted to the Court the centralizing minutes along with all the minutes from the electoral offices. An examination of these documents revealed that out of the 18,021,800 registered voters on the permanent lists, 9,465,650 turned out to vote, with 9,242,186 valid votes and 223,132 null votes. Călin Georgescu received 2,120,401 votes, Elena-Valerica Lasconi 1,772,500 votes, and Ion-Marcel Ciolacu 1,769,760 votes.

Legal analysis and the Court's decision

The court found that none of the candidates received the absolute majority required to be elected in the first round, specifically 9,010,901 votes. Consequently, applying constitutional and legal provisions, it established the necessity of organizing a second round of voting between the top two candidates. This is scheduled to take place on December 8, 2024, between Călin Georgescu and Elena-Valerica Lasconi, in that order.

The checks carried out and the findings of the Court

In exercising its constitutional duties, the Court verified the regularity of the preparation of all electoral documents. No irregularities were identified in the minutes that could undermine the established results. This verification was all the more rigorous as it followed the examination of the two appeals filed against the election.

The effects of the decision and the next steps

The decision no. 31/2024 has immediate and general legal effects. It validates the results of the first round, definitively establishes the candidates for the second round, and sets the date for it. Publication in the Official Gazette and dissemination through the media ensure the public and official nature of this fundamental decision for the electoral process.

The significance within the overall electoral process

This decision concludes the first stage of the 2024 presidential elections, following previous rulings by the Court that eliminated any doubts regarding the validity of the ballot. The Court's methodical and comprehensive approach is noteworthy, as it distinctly addressed the contestation aspects (through rulings 29 and 30) and the validation aspects (through ruling 31), thereby ensuring both the legality and legitimacy of the electoral process.

Decision 32/2024 of TOTAL INVALIDATION of the presidential elections

The decision no. 32/2024 of the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR) represents an unprecedented ruling in the post-December history of the country, which ordered the complete annulment of the presidential elections of 2024.

The decision was made in the context of serious allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation of the electoral process, brought to the Court's attention through declassified informational notes from the intelligence services (SRI, SIE, DGPI, STS).

These documents indicated multiple irregularities in the conduct of the elections, including the use of digital technologies and artificial intelligence to influence voting, violations of campaign finance rules, and cyberattacks on electoral infrastructure.

In light of these accusations that could potentially undermine the very democratic legitimacy of the presidential election, the Court found itself compelled to take an unprecedented measure, namely the complete annulment of the elections.

The legal and constitutional basis of the decision

The Constitutional Court based its decision on an extensive interpretation of its powers as provided in Article 146 letter f) of the Constitution, which states that it "ensures compliance with the procedure for the election of the President of Romania and confirms the results of the ballot." This provision was correlated with the fundamental principles of the rule of law, enshrined in Article 1 paragraphs (3) and (5) of the supreme law, as well as with the provisions of Article 2 which establish that national sovereignty "is exercised through representative bodies, constituted by free, periodic, and fair elections."

Essentially, the Court considered that the notion of "oversight" of the electoral process not only grants a formal role in verifying compliance with the rules governing elections but also entails a substantial responsibility to ensure the integrity and fairness of the entire electoral process.

This teleological interpretation marks a significant expansion of the traditional competence of the Constitutional Court in electoral matters, justified by the need to adapt constitutional control to the new challenges of the digital age.

Analysis of samples and probation standards

The CCR's decision is primarily based on information and analyses provided by intelligence services through declassified notes. This unusual situation inevitably raises issues of admissibility and evidential weight of these documents in the context of constitutional review.

On one hand, the use of intelligence data to protect the integrity of elections can be seen as a beneficial leveraging of these institutions' analytical capabilities in service of democracy. Informative notes have highlighted emerging risks and complex phenomena of vote influence that would have been difficult to detect and prove through traditional legal means.

On the other hand, however, the absence of a clear legal framework regulating the use of this information as evidence in constitutional proceedings raises issues from the perspective of classical principles of justice, such as publicity, adversariality, and the right to defense of the parties involved.

Furthermore, the non-public and unverifiable nature of the data in the service reports makes it difficult to rigorously assess their evidentiary value against the usual standards of constitutional review.

Regarding the standard of probation applied, the Court does not provide details within the decision concerning the type and degree of evidence it deemed sufficient to establish irregularities that would justify the annulment of the elections.

In comparison to the constitutional jurisprudence of other states regarding the annulment of elections, it can be observed that the Constitutional Court seems to have applied a relatively low evidentiary standard, relying more on indications, correlations, and risk analyses, rather than on direct and concrete evidence of actual vote tampering.

Assessment of the proportionality of the measure to annul the elections

The complete annulment of the presidential election is undoubtedly an extreme form of intervention in an electoral process, which must undergo a rigorous proportionality test.

This principle, enshrined in both Romanian constitutional law and European law, requires that any measure affecting a fundamental right must be appropriate, necessary, and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

In its analysis, the Court correctly identified the existence of a legitimate and important purpose of the decision, namely ensuring the free and fair nature of elections as a fundamental premise of the very democratic legitimacy of the presidential office.

Furthermore, the Court argued the necessity and appropriateness of the annulment measure, in relation to the nature and extent of the irregularities identified, which would have irreparably compromised the outcome of the election.

Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the strictly proportional nature of this radical solution. Thus, while the manipulation of the electorate through digital technologies is extremely serious, it does not necessarily equate to a direct fraud of the voting process itself.

A more nuanced analysis could have considered other less intrusive corrective measures, such as notifying law enforcement for the investigation of the identified facts, requiring transparency in the funding of subsequent campaigns, or developing mechanisms to counter misinformation.

Therefore, while the goal of protecting the integrity of elections is beyond dispute, it remains debatable whether the complete annulment of the vote was the most proportional means of achieving this objective.

The court could have developed a more detailed argument regarding the objective impossibility of remedying the identified irregularities through other constitutional and legal means.

Compliance with international electoral standards

The decision of the Constitutional Court must be analyzed in light of its compliance with international norms and best practices in the organization and validation of electoral processes.

Among these, particular relevance is held by the European Convention on Human Rights (especially Article 3 of Additional Protocol No. 1) and the documents of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).

Undoubtedly, the Court's decision aligns with the increasingly pronounced European trend of recognizing the positive obligations of states to ensure not only the organization of free elections but also a climate of fairness and integrity in the electoral campaign.

From this perspective, the extension of the guarantees in Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR to new aspects of the electoral process in the digital age, such as protection against online manipulation, represents a necessary and legitimate endeavor.

At the same time, however, European standards emphasize the importance of the stability and predictability of electoral legislation, as well as the presumption of validity of the election results.

The annulment of legally conducted elections post-factum must remain an entirely exceptional measure, justified only in cases of massive and demonstrable voter fraud.

In the absence of explicit legal criteria defining these extreme situations, the decision of the Constitutional Court risks being perceived as unpredictable and potentially arbitrary.

Furthermore, the Venice Commission has repeatedly emphasized the importance of ensuring an adversarial procedure and the right to defense for the interested parties in any election invalidation procedures.

From this perspective, the fact that the service reports were declassified only after the completion of the first round and that those targeted did not have the opportunity to contest them or provide explanations raises questions about the fairness of the procedure as a whole.

The implications and effects of the decision

Beyond the immediate consequences for the 2024 presidential election, Decision No. 32/2024 of the Constitutional Court has systemic implications for the very constitutional architecture of Romania. It marks a significant redefinition of the Court's role in ensuring the integrity of electoral processes, with potential long-term effects.

On one hand, the decision can be seen as a strong and necessary signal that any form of manipulation or illegitimate influence on elections will not be tolerated, regardless of the means or technologies employed.

It asserts the intrinsic constitutional value of citizens' right to freely and consciously form and express their political will as the foundation of all democratic legitimacy.

In this regard, the decision may have a positive effect in stimulating public debate regarding the standards of fairness in electoral campaigns in the post-truth era.

On the other hand, however, the decision also presents significant risks to the stability and predictability of the constitutional system.

By unjustifiably extending the competence of the Constitutional Court beyond the letter of the Constitution, it may pave the way for predominantly political post-electoral challenges, where the mere invocation of "inappropriate influences" could lead to the annulment of any election.

This perspective could undermine public trust in the institutional integrity of democratic processes and, in the long term, weaken the very foundation of the state's representativeness.

Analysis of the legality and compliance with international standards of CCR Decision No. 32/2024

The decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania no. 32/2024, which ordered the complete annulment of the presidential elections, raises serious issues of constitutionality and compatibility with international electoral norms and jurisprudence. The Court's decision, although driven by the legitimate intention to protect the integrity of elections against new risks of digital manipulation, appears to violate several fundamental principles of the rule of law and electoral rights.

First of all, the measure of completely canceling the presidential election seems to contradict the requirements of legality and legal security, in the absence of an express constitutional and legal basis that would provide for and contextualize such an extreme solution. The subsequent invalidation of legally conducted elections, without clear and predictable normative criteria, is likely to undermine citizens' trust in the integrity of electoral processes and the stability of democratic rules.

Secondly, the grounding of the CCR's decision on evidence derived from confidential reports of intelligence services, without a genuine adversarial procedure allowing interested parties to contest them, raises serious doubts regarding the respect for the right to defense and a fair trial, guaranteed both constitutionally and conventionally. The use of such non-public and unverifiable information as a basis for a decision with such severe implications for electoral rights is problematic from the perspective of ECHR jurisprudence and the standards established by the Venice Commission.

Thirdly, the strictly proportional nature of the measure to annul the elections in relation to the actual extent of the identified irregularities is questionable. Given that it has not been demonstrated through direct and irrefutable evidence that the possible influence on the vote through digital means effectively led to a change in the election outcome, the total invalidation of the election appears as an excessive and disproportionate interference in the electoral rights of citizens and electoral competitors.

Last but not least, through its approach, the Constitutional Court seems to have overlooked the cardinal principle of stability and predictability in electoral legislation, which has been consistently emphasized by both the Venice Commission and other international bodies. The retroactive modification of the rules regarding the validation of elections, in the absence of a clear and accessible prior legal regulation, is likely to undermine the free and fair nature of elections, creating grounds for arbitrariness and abuse.

Indeed, the reported vulnerabilities do not diminish the importance of the alarm raised by the Constitutional Court regarding the risks that digital manipulation can pose to the integrity of democratic processes. On the contrary, they demonstrate the urgent necessity for lawmakers to intervene in order to adapt the regulatory framework concerning elections to the new technological realities, in a manner that ensures effective and proportionate mechanisms for preventing and sanctioning any irregularities, in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law.

However, the path to achieving this goal cannot be the arbitrary resolution of the issue by the constitutional court, disregarding its own limits of competence and the fundamental rights of citizens. In a true rule of law, the defense of democracy must be carried out through strictly democratic means, within and not outside the constitutional order.

Otherwise, instead of strengthening the resilience of our electoral system in the face of new risks, we risk undermining the very foundations of its legitimacy by substituting the sovereign will of the people with the convenient solutions of temporary authorities. This would truly be a "fraud" of democracy, far more serious than any manipulation of the vote.

Summary and Conclusion

This analysis, as much as we wished to elaborate on it, fails to address many of the essential points raised by civil society.

First of all, we have not managed to analyze the legality of the electoral propaganda of candidate Calin Georgescu, nor to discuss the independently obtained evidence that proves or undermines the credibility of the hypothesis of foreign state involvement.

Secondly, we have not managed to analyze the general silence from international partners, who have remained cautious about criticizing the consequences of the elections. We have also not examined the opinions of the political parties.

Thirdly, we did not manage to discuss the implications of the CCR's decision, specifically regarding the postponement of the elections and the social and political consequences of that decision.

This information will be further developed either on Facebook in separate posts on my personal channel or here in a more in-depth article.